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Abstract
In the late 80’s Pasinetti showed that the essential feature of the Cambridge Equation
is preserved in his model of growth and income distribution with balanced or unbalanced
budget. He did not work out both the share of incomes and the conditions of stability and
was not formally concerned with a permanent budget surplus. The present paper deals
with the case of a closed economy in which, besides direct taxation, indirect taxation
on government’s own expenditures is explicitly considered and the government saves
permanently at a given rate. The extended Cambridge Equation and the share of proﬁts
are obtained. It is also shown that the stability result requires additional assumptions.
Boundary conditions are introduced and the long-run local stability result is attained,
thus corroborating the generality and robustness of Pasinetti’s original insight
Keywords: Budget Surplus, Cambridge Equation, Growth, Distribution, Stability
JEL Classiﬁcation: O41, P16, P24
Resumo
Em 1989 Pasinetti mostra que a caracter´ ıstica essencial da Equa¸ c˜ ao de Cambridge
´ e preservada independentemente do or¸ camento governamental ser equilibrado ou
desequilibrado. Ele inclui o caso onde o governo taxa seus pr´ oprios dispˆ endios, mas n˜ ao
trata formalmente do or¸ camento superavit´ ario. No presente artigo admite-se uma taxa de
poupan¸ ca governamental constante e positiva e considera-se tanto taxa¸ c˜ ao direta quanto
indireta. Nesse contexto obt´ em-se a Equa¸ c˜ ao de Cambridge Estendida. Ent˜ ao analisamos
a reparti¸ c˜ ao dos lucros e a estabilidade local de longo prazo (dadas condi¸ c˜ oes plaus´ ıveis de
contorno). Fica clara a validade, generalidade e robustez do insight original de Pasinetti
tamb´ em para o caso de super´ avit permanente.
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1. Introduction
Pasinetti (1989) pointed out his surprise indicating that, till then, the many
extensions of the Cambridge Equation have paid little attention to the role
of government taxation and expenditure, though the literature on such result
had grown immensely. His aim was to explore further the ‘Keynesian’ theory of
income distribution between capitalists and workers when balanced or unbalanced
government budget are considered. He shows that the essential feature of the
Cambridge Theorem is preserved in such extensions on Kaldor’s celebrated proﬁt
and distribution theory.
It is interesting to notice that Pasinetti (1962) raised a comment according to
which Kaldor (1955-56) overlooks the point that when workers save they become
gradually owners of part of the capital (according to their accumulated savings
lent to capitalists) and, as such, they receive proﬁts and wages as income. In
this vein he corrected Kaldor’s ‘logical slip’, and showed that, despite this, in a
long-run equilibrium-growth path with full employment and with two categories of
savers (the capitalists and the workers) the rate of proﬁts (r) is determined by the
natural rate of growth 1 (gn) divided by the capitalists’ propensity to save (sc),
independently of anything else, and, in particular, independently of technology
and of the workers’ propensity to save (sw). This is the Cambridge Theorem and
his conclusion involves well know restrictions. 2 Fundamentally, Pasinetti (1962)
is concerned with the nature of the ultimate long-period steady-state equilibrium
when the ratio of property owned by capitalists to that owned by workers tends to
its ﬁnal value in the context of a closed economy without government participation.
The explicit assumptions used to attain the Cambridge Result are:
i) equality, in the long period, between the rate of proﬁt earned by capitalists (r)
and the rate of interest earned by the workers on their accumulated savings;
ii) the share of capital stock of each class is proportional to its share of
accumulated savings;
iii) capitalists save a constant proportion of their proﬁt income and workers save
the same proportion out of wages as they do out of any proﬁts, with 1 > sc >
sw > 0, where sc and sw are exogenously given;
iv) in equilibrium, total savings equal investment, the latter being the amount
required to balance exogenously given rates of population growth and technical
progress.
From this set of conditions, using the standard notation, the Cambridge Result
follows:
this paper was presented as the inaugural conference of the ANPEC-SUL, Curitiba, Brazil, June 2008.
E-mail address: joanilioteixeira@hotmail.com.
1 It represents the maximum sustainable rate of growth that technical conditions make available to the
economic system as a whole. According to Harrod (1948), gn = n + λ, where n is the percentage rate
of growth of the labour force and λ is the percentage rate of growth of productivity (labour saving).
2 For an evaluation and controversies on this subject see Harcourt (1972) and Oreiro (2005). The
expressions Cambridge Theorem, Cambridge Result, Pasinetti’s Result and Cambridge Equation are
interchangeable.
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r =P/K = (Pc/K)/(Kc/K) = (Pc/K)/(Sc/S) = (Pc/K)/(scPc/I)
=(1/sc)(I/K) = gn/sc
If capitalists save their entire income (that is, if sc = 1) the relation above boils
down to r = gn. This is the famous ‘golden rule’ of accumulation introduced by
von Neumann (1945-46). Furthermore, multiplying both sides of the Cambridge
Result by the capital-output ratio (v) leads to the conclusion that the distribution
of income between proﬁts and wages in full employment, is given by P/Y = vgn/sc.
Therefore, it is independent of workers’ saving behaviour. In same paper Pasinetti
also deals with the stability conditions.
Pasinetti’s (1962) approach implies that classes are intergenerational stable with
a rigid segmentation between capitalists and workers, each with a distinct saving
behaviour. Granted that social mobility is usually limited, the model captures some
important elements of class conﬂict. Of course the conditions above are simpliﬁed
assumptions that at a closer look might be questioned as being too unrealistic.
However, most of the criticism misses the point that he deals with a self-constrained
set of theoretical issues – a world of certainty, with only two social classes, and
the long-run performance of a non-monetary economy in the sense that the only
available stores of value are readily reproducible (resource-using) durable goods.
In order to guarantee the existence of a two-class economy, Pasinetti includes the
condition sc > I/Y > sw, which I keep all along this paper. I am also respecting
Steedman (1972) view that when account is taken of taxation and government
spending, in general a Meade (1966) equilibrium based on the constraint sw =
I/Y is ruled out. In the same vein, Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) alternative
balanced growth path (or anti-Pasinetti theorem) can be seeing as a simple
attempt to resurrect the marginal productivity theory, given that their parameters
magnitudes to attain the dual result are far way from reality [see Faria and Teixeira
(1999)].
Pasinetti, in his 1989 article, deals with a closed economic system, with direct and
indirect taxation, government expenditures and considers the equilibrium-growth
paths on which all magnitudes grow steadily and indeﬁnitely. In other words,
paths on which sg (a sort of propensity to save of the government) may be
negative (deﬁcit), positive (surplus), or zero (balanced budget). In a typical
Keynesian-Kaleckian manner, investment, or rather the ratio of investment to
output is treated as an independent variable, reﬂecting the view that the direction
of causality runs from investment to savings. Such amount of investment is the one
that keeps full employment over time.
The simplest case of balanced government budget presents no diﬃculties. He
shows that the result is consistent with his original contribution concerning the
irrelevance of workers’ rate of savings. After, he analyses formally the case of
a permanent government deﬁcit (a case that cannot be dismissed on empirical
grounds) not only to show that it can be consistent with Cambridge Result of
growth and distribution, but also to point out that in this model there arises
a “way of conceiving of the meaning and consequences of public debt” which
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goes back to Ricardo (p. 33). His approach is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
interpretation of the ’Ricardian Equivalence’ proposed by Barro (1974) and by
other modern neoclassical authors. In other words, Pasinetti considers the case
of a permanent budget deﬁcit to study the Ricardian Equivalence in Cambridge
Models and to reject the possibility that such Equivalence can there be transformed
into ‘Neutrality Theorem’. For this reason he leaves aside the case of a permanent
budget surplus.
The above consideration justiﬁes his modelling hypotheses. However, he also
argues that a systematic government surplus is “hardly justiﬁable as a long-run
policy, and (...) it is in any case symmetrical (...) to the case of a government
systematic deﬁcit” [Pasinetti (1989, p. 30)].
I have been puzzled by part of Pasinetti’s view on two points. Firstly, I am
not convinced that a permanent budget surplus makes no sense. Further reading
has made me shade his understanding on this issue since budget surplus may
promote macrodynamic capability. 3 Secondly, from the theoretical standpoint the
argument concerning a permanently positive propensity to save of the government
may somewhat be analogous to the one applied by Pasinetti to Kaldor’s ‘logical
slip’. Provided that the government systematically spends less than it rises from
taxation, it will gradually become owner of part the capital stock and, therefore,
will receive both proﬁts and taxes as income.
A proviso I could make is that if the budget-surplus aﬀects the level of activity
and this has and adverse eﬀect on the “animal spirits” of business people, so that
the rate of planned accumulation falls, there will not be as much demand for
government ﬁnance from the capitalists as otherwise would have occurred. Kalecki
(1971, p. 139) analysed the suspicion and opposition from ‘industrial leaders’ to
government activities. A certain “dislike of the social and political changes resulting
from the maintenance of full employment”. But he only considered the case of
government deﬁcit spending ﬁnanced by loans.
It could also be pondered that, actually, governments neither do nor ﬁx a priori
their own rate of saving. To this I would argue that in many countries Sg is greater
than zero, as a form of forced saving, whose virtue is to ‘channel’ those savings
into ‘socially good’ projects. Something like the concept of a National Bank of
Social-Economic Development, a kind of BNDES in Brazil. Reactions to this depend
in large part, I think, on whether society trusts the government to invest well in
socially beneﬁcial way (broadly deﬁned). 4
3 According to Mollo and Teixeira (2008, p. 271), macrodynamic capability is the process of preparing
or enhancing the environment of a country or region in the sense of stimulating and assuring the
possibility of investment, innovation, growth, etc. The State plays a special role on such process in order
to strengthen the fundamental balances of economic policy, something that involves: i) an appropriate
real interest rate, ii) an inﬂation rate close to those of its trading partners, iii) a competitive and
predictable exchange rate, and iv) long-term strategies for public investment projects. These goals need
to be consistent with both internal and external equilibrium, so that a policy of self-sustaining growth,
based essentially on productive investment, can become viable in an open economy. It must be stressed,
however, that in the present paper I am dealing only with a closed economy.
4 For the sake of illustration it is interesting to mention that “semi permanent” budget surplus has
been a part of economic and political history. There are important examples of countries forcing the
242 EconomiA, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.10, n.2, p.239–251, May-Aug 2009Growth, Distribution, Stability and Government Budget Surplus: The Extended Cambridge Equation
Furthermore, from a point in time if the government has a systematic budget
surplus, this would mean reducing its public debt, and hence the ﬁnancial capital
owned by the public (similar to Pasinetti’s objection to Kaldor not paying attention
to what workers do with their accumulated saving). It may plausibly be assumed
that a reduction in public debt falls on the workers owning interest-bearing ﬁnancial
assets. What these considerations mean for the steady state with Pasinetti type
interior solution, rather than Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) type corner solution,
is not clear.
Government’s accumulated investment (capital accumulation) earns proﬁts that,
added to taxation, make the income of the ‘public sector’. Total savings is now
composed by capitalists’ savings, workers’ savings and government’s savings. This
raises some interesting issues. Notice that, like Pasinetti, besides direct taxation,
I am explicitly considering all indirect taxation, including government’s own
expenditures – an issue which requires a careful attention in order to remove the
possibility of double counting.
Let me advance the view that concerning the extended Cambridge Equation for
the case of a budget surplus, as expected, I obtained Pasinetti’s (1989) Result. This,
once again, shows that the workers’ propensity to save is irrelevant in determining
the equilibrium rate of proﬁt, corroborating the validity, robustness and generality
of the Cambridge Theorem. However, in the mentioned paper, Pasinetti did not
work out formally the shares of incomes. Dealing with balanced budget, he mentions
(p. 29, footnote) that the income distribution – shares of workers income and
capitalists’ income – is more complicated to derive when taxation is introduced.
He indicates two of his own papers that can be used to get such results but he did
not produce them and did not mention the stability conditions.
Here the share of proﬁts is shown and the stability condition is examined for
the case in which the government is allowed to save permanently at a given
fraction of its income. In order to attain long-run local stability a set of boundary
conditions are included and the stability result obtained. After this introduction,
section 2 formalizes the case of a systematic government surplus, the extended
Cambridge Equation, distribution and stability. Section 3 hints to some potential
macrodynamic implications of the approach I have tackled and concludes with new
challenges.
2. Taxation, Budget Surplus and the Stability Conditions
Pasinetti’s analysis to government revenues from taxation (T) captures both
direct (Td) and indirect (Ti) taxes. The latter applies to all consumption
accumulation of foreign exchange and then unload to secure ﬁnancial supremacy (U.S and France did
it to dislodge Britain in 1961 from Gold Standard base supremacy; China might to this in not to
distant a future. However, such argument is only valid if an open economy is considered. Notice that in
an accounting sense, assuming other agents are in balanced position, government surplus would equal
trade surplus and this can be mentioned with the warning that this is not to be interpreted as a causal
relation.
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expenditure of workers, capitalists and the government itself. According to the
conventional notation and the usual assumptions regarding the parameters, it
follows that: 5
T =twW + tpPw + tpPc + ti[(1 − sw)(1 − tw)W + (1 − sw)(1 − tp)Pw
+(1 − sc)(1 − tp)Pc + Cg (2.1)
Moving from balanced government budget to the case of systematic deﬁcit
(surplus) he introduces a conventional government’s expenditure function:
Cg = (1 − sg)T (2.2)
However, if the government is allowed to save (Sg), we should expect the existence
of an additional variable, namely the government proﬁts (Pg), to be included as
part of its income (Yg). Accordingly, if the unique saving rate (sg) applies to both
categories of income (proﬁts and taxation), it is readily seen that:
Sg = sgYg = sg(Pg + T) = sg(Pg + Td + Ti) (2.3)
Now I will departure, somewhat, from Pasinetti’s approach. Notice that Ti
contains a fraction of the government proﬁt which is counted twice – the indirect
taxes associated to the government’s consumption expenditure (Tig) itself. 6 Thus:
Tig = ti(1 − sg)Pg + ti(1 − sg)Td + ti(1 − sg)Ti (2.4)
To eliminate this double counting I need to subtract the mentioned fraction from
the government’s proﬁts and thus I have a new variable (P∗
g ). It follows that:
Cg = (1 − sg)(P∗
g + T), where P∗
g = [1 − ti(1 − sg)]Pg (2.5)
is the net government proﬁt.
Substituting (2.5) in (2.1), expression (2.6), the proper government’s saving
function [Teixeira (1999, p. 82)], as a proportion of the corrected public revenue
(Rg) is:
Sg =sgRg = sgα{[tw + ti(1 − sw)(1 − tw)]W + [tp + ti(1 − sw)(1 − tp)]Pw
+[tp + ti(1 − sp)(1 − tp)]Pc} + sg[(α − 1)ti(1 − sg) + 1]Pg (2.6)
where α = [1 − ti(1 − sg)]−1 is the “correction factor” due to fact government
taxes its own expenditure. (2.6) excludes the double counting. So, the total saving
(S = Sw + Sc + Sg) is given by:
5 Notice that tw is the proportional (direct) tax on wages and tp is proportional (direct) tax on
proﬁt. I am assuming that 0 < tp < tw < 1, diﬀers from Pasinetti (1989). Direct taxes may changes







expressions (2.8, 2.9 and 2.10) which is crucial for later argument following (2.22).
6 This point was ﬁrst raised by Teixeira and Ara´ ujo (1991a) in their appraisal of Dalziel’s (1989)
model of long-run distributive equilibrium. For further comments on this topic see Teixeira (1991),
where the Cambridge Result and the long-run income distribution were derived. Some rewriting has
been necessary in order to keep the track in the present paper. International trade is also discussed
there but not reproduced here.




cPc + sg[(α − 1)ti(1 − sg) + 1]Pg (2.7)
where
s′
ww = sw(1 − tw) + sgα[tw + ti(1 − sw)(1 − tw)] (2.8)
s′
wc = sw(1 − tp) + sgα[tp + ti(1 − sw)(1 − tp)] (2.9)
s′
c = sc(1 − tp) + sgα[tp + ti(1 − sc)(1 − tp)] (2.10)
The last three deﬁnitions are the same as indicated by Pasinetti (1989, p. 30),
but my saving function (2.7) contains an additional term sg[(α−1)ti(1−sg)+1]Pg
to capture the amendment above proposed due to the government’s taxation of its
own expenditure.
The long-run rate of proﬁt (r) is obtained from the usual hypothesis:
i) proportionality between savings and capital stocks (S/K = Sc/Kc =
Sw/Kw = Sg/Kg, where K = Kc + Kw + Kg);
ii) equalization of the diﬀerent rates of proﬁts (P/K = Pc/Kc = Pw/Kw =
Pg/Kg = r); and
iii) equilibrium between investment (I) and saving (S), with I → S.
From (iii): I = S → I/K = S/K.
From (i): I/K = Sc/Kc = s′
cPc/Kc = s′
cP/K ∴ I/K = gn/s′
c, since I/K = gn is
the natural rate of growth.
From (ii): r = P/K = Pc/Kc = gn/s′
c.







sc(1 − tp) + sgα[tp + ti(1 − sc)(1 − tp)]
(2.11)
This characterizes the generality of his result. Even if workers are allowed to
save, they have no inﬂuence on the long-run rate of proﬁts.
The long-run income distribution (P/Y ) is obtained directly from P/K =













That is, again, as in the original version, the long-run distribution of income
in full employment is independent of workers’ saving behaviour. Given this result
it would be interesting to ﬁnd the conditions on the relevant savings rates that
guarantee that the government would not accumulate asymptotically all the capital
and sweep both capitalists and workers away from the system. In Pasinetti (1974,
p. 130) the condition sw is found that prevents workers from sweeping capitalists
away from the system. In the case of government sustained budget surplus the
condition required to attain the ‘euthanasia’ of the capitalist is far from real world
magnitudes.
Now I will deal with the conditions of stability of the long-run income
distribution. Naturally, the foregoing analysis would be incomplete if it did not
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includes the limits within which the result above has economic meaning in long-run
equilibrium and conditions under which it is stable. Pasinetti (1989) does not
produce such analysis. The equilibrium will be locally and dynamically stable if
























However, the only derivative whose sign is known is d(W/Y )/d(P/Y ), which is
negative. Expressing Pc in terms of P,Pw and Pg, there still remain two derivatives
needing additional assumptions concerning their sign; that is d(Pw/Y )/d(P/Y ) and
d(Pg/Y )/d(P/Y ). Otherwise the stability result is inconclusive. As matter of fact,
the local stability of the equilibrium depends on the eﬀects that income changes
may have in the distributive variables, and these eﬀects are not (and cannot) be
speciﬁed through an equilibrium analysis without additional assumptions. 7 Here I
follow the approach introduced by Pasinetti (1962). His stability analysis assumes
that full employment output is maintained continuously and the disequilibrium
between investment and saving as share of the gross domestic product is adjusted
by share of proﬁt.
Notice that the approach to the equilibrium is accelerated in this version of the
Kaldor-Pasinetti process where the State earns proﬁts and indirect taxation on
government expenditures is properly considered. This conclusion derives from the
assumptions, 0 < sg < 1,Pg > 0,0 < ti < 1, and thus α > 1. Furthermore, (2.13)
is a monotonically increasing function of sg.
As pointed out by Pasinetti (1974, p. 114), “as time (t) goes on, the proﬁt
margins, and therefore the share of total proﬁts, remain constant, increase or
decrease according as to whether total savings produced by the system tend to be
equal, smaller, or greater than total investment”. Now, I am in a position to examine
the conditions of stability following the Kaldorian hypothesis that the prices and the
proﬁt margins are ﬂexible in the long-run in relation to the variable units’ costs.
This approach allows me to describe the adjustment mechanism of distributive
equilibrium according the so called tatˆ onnement, i.e., through the excess demand





















7 In order to study the local stability Faria and Teixeira (1999) assume that the technology can be
described by a well-behaved neoclassical production function with Pasinettian saving behaviour but
such approach raises methodological controversies.






c < 1 besides the restrictions 0 < sw < sg < I/Y < sc < 1 in order
to limit the validity of the present formulation to the range in which the model has an economic meaning.




ww. The local stability argument bellow follows strictly Pasinetti
(1962). Instead, I could just take the derivative of (2.14). If the single variable phase diagrammed in
P/Y , i.e. the slope of d/dt(P/Y ) with respect to P/Y has a negative slope at equilibrium, which boils
down to condition (2.21) the system is stable.
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If (P/Y )∗ is the level of distributive equilibrium, than (I/Y ) = (S/Y ) and thus
E(P/Y )∗ = 0. On the other hand, changes in (P/Y ), as time goes on, are in direct







= f [E(P/Y )],f′ > 0,f(0) = 0 (2.15)
























￿∗￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < δ (2.16)
where |(P/Y )0 − (P/Y )∗| is the Euclidian norm in the space P/Y and δ is a real
number small enough, describing the neighbourhood around (P/Y )∗.
In order to obtain the local dynamic stability conditions it is suﬃcient to consider
f[E(P/Y )] according to the Taylor expansion around (P/Y )∗. Then, taking only































Expression (2.17) is a simple linear diﬀerential equation of the ﬁrst order. As, by
deﬁnition, f′(0) > 0, the solution will converge to (P/Y )∗ provided that m < 0.
Since investment is exogenously determined as that amount “which has to be
undertaken in order to keep full employment over time” [Pasinetti (1974, p. 114)],
the local dynamic stability condition is reduced to:
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
d(S/Y )
d(P/Y )
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(P/Y )∗
> 0 (2.18)
After substituting from the savings function, it follows that the long-run income





























According to the original version of Pasinetti (1974) on this matter, in the
short-run, d(Pw/Y )/d(P/Y ) = 0. Besides, since in his model Y is entirely shared




This result shows that from the standpoint of the condition of short-run local
stability, it is necessary to add to the original model of Pasinetti (1974) the
“correction factor” due to the fact that government taxes its own expenditure
as I am dealing with the case of unbalanced budget. It follows that the possibility
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of the government to sustain permanently a budget surplus (or deﬁcit) aﬀects not
only the condition of existence of the distributive equilibrium but also the short-run
equilibrium.
The local condition of long-run dynamic stability in the case of exponential
growth depends of the ‘fundamental relation between proﬁts and savings’,
(Pw/Sw) = (Pc/Sc), shown by Pasinetti (1974, p. 110), no matter how many
categories of participants in the economy is considered. In our case (Pw/Sw) =
















Notice that (2.21) holds since government saving propensity does not enter into
















Therefore, the long-run distributive equilibrium will be locally and dynamically
stable if the expression (2.7) attends the condition s′
c > s′
wc > s′
ww > 0. No
doubt my approach follows perhaps to narrowly the economic logic of Pasinetti
(1962). Teixeira and Ara´ ujo (1991b) show that distributive equilibrium is stable
if the saving ratio, S/Y , is more positively inclined than the investment ratio,
I/Y , exogenously given. It is not diﬃcult to see that if the derivative of (2.14) is
taken, provided that the single variable phase diagram in P/Y , i.e. the slope of
d(P/Y )/dt with respect to P/Y has a negative slope at equilibrium, which boils
down to condition (2.18), the system is stable.
My long local stability argument is correct, like Pasinetti (1962). However, I
suspect that such problem (local stability) can only be properly solved in richer
dynamic systems considered from diﬀerent angles. Actually, on this technical issue,
the problem is somewhat complex when both output and proﬁt share adjust
simultaneously to excess demand (Bhaduri 2008). In Pasinetti (1962) only the
latter does.
3. Final Remarks
In his 1989 paper on the theory of proﬁt and income distribution, Pasinetti
is concerned with the role of government taxation and expenditures. Dealing
with both balanced and deﬁcit budgets he obtains a Cambridge Equation, which
represents a ﬁne result, but he neglects the case of sustained superavit and does
not work out both the distribution of income and the stability conditions. As I
have shown, it is possible to extend his approach to the case of a budget systematic
248 EconomiA, Bras´ ılia(DF), v.10, n.2, p.239–251, May-Aug 2009Growth, Distribution, Stability and Government Budget Surplus: The Extended Cambridge Equation
surplus in a way that regards indirect taxation on government’s own expenditures
explicitly, and the existence of public capital stock according to the government’s
accumulated savings. This was done in a framework of a closed economy and
both the long-run rate of proﬁt and the share of proﬁts were established. The
extended Cambridge Equation I have obtained is the same obtained by Pasinetti.
This characterizes the generality of his main result: even if workers are allowed to
save, they have no inﬂuence on the long-run rate of proﬁt, despite the complex
institutional set-up here.
As I have also shown how taxation and government permanent budget surplus
aﬀect the distributive equilibrium it is interesting to notice that the stability
conditions become indeterminate. This is due to the fact that some of the
derivatives involved have undeﬁned signs. Thus, additional hypotheses were needed
to ensure stability otherwise no deﬁnitive results can be obtained.
The Kaldor-Pasinetti process is an area of economic theory that provides
stimulating research since it raises some important issues towards macroeconomic
perspectives. It may suggest, in broad outline, shrewd conjectures concerning
sustained growth, distribution, full employment and macrodynamic capability.
Actually, because of their power to tax, governments quite frequently do things that
optimizing agents would not do and this can persists long after private enterprises
have been forced to halt due to a lack of resources.
I would like to point out that I have started this paper with a polemical puzzle
(and new paradigm) on a systematic government budget surplus. Someone may
feel that such concern is of little relevance for a discussion of what determines the
long-run rate of proﬁt in a capitalist economy. I do not believe that I am dealing
with an esoteric issue, quite the contrary. As Harcourt (1971, p. 28) argues: “For if
economic theory, no matter how beautiful and pure its abstract logic may be, does
not deal with real puzzles and real people it quickly ceases to have a life of its own
and withers and dies”.
To conclude, as indicated by Teixeira (1998, p. 280), lines of research such
as international trade and foreign debt, diﬀerent rates of interest and proﬁt for
public and private assets, monetary sector, Ricardian debt/taxation equivalence,
inter-generational wealth accumulation are some of the challenges being tackled.
These contributions have tended to show that the essential features of the
Cambridge Result are not invalidated under a wide range of general assumptions,
thus corroborating the generality and robustness of Pasinetti’s original insight. 9
Thus, extensions of such heterodox branch of the theory of growth and distribution
are alive and ﬂourishing. It presents newer challenges and promises for a more
enlightened tomorrow, questioning propositions which rule most of the academia,
the policy makers, the media and international institutions. Also chartering out
9 Teixeira (1999) validates the Cambridge Theorem and considers some implications of the rate of
proﬁt for stability when unbalanced government budgets and non-zero balance of payments prevail.
Baranzini (1991) covers a broad range of topics in the theory of wealth distribution and accumulation,
including inter-generational analysis.
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new roads ahead in order to encourage that all citizens of the world live with
dignity. 10 Of course much needs to be done to ensure this vision.
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